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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
CYNTHIA R.ROBLEY, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
I Case No. 970453 
) Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff/Appellee, State of Utah responds to Defendant/Appellant, Cynthia R. Robley's 
appeal from a sentence entered by Judge Pamela G. Heffernan in the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County following Defendant's guilty plea to a class A misdemeanor for driving 
under the influence. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant's appeal pursuant to the Utah 
Judicial Code. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the Defendant denied her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel 
because the trial court sentenced her while she was represented by a different attorney from the 
Public Defender's Association and without counsel taking the opportunity to dispute the findings 
of the pre-sentence report from Adult Probation and Parole? 
The Standard for appellate review on this issue requires a determination of whether 
Defendant's counsel performed deficiently and whether any deficient performance prejudiced the 
Defendant. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Carter 776 P.2d 886, 
893 (Utah 1989). Claims like the Defendant's "present a mixed question of fact and law. . . . 
where the trial court has previously heard a motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel, 
reviewing courts are free to make an independent determination of a trial court's conclusions. 
However, the trial court's factual findings shall not be set aside on appeal unless clearly 
erroneous." State v. Tyler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1993) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
2. Has the issue presented for appeal become moot because the Defendant has been 
released from custody and is not currently on probationary supervision? 
If an appellate court finds the issues on appeal have been rendered moot, then they do not 
rule on the merits if the appellant "no longer has a stake in the outcome" unless the issue 
presented is one "capable of repetition, but evading review" or if the "suit has been duly certified 
as a class action." Napier v. Gertrude. 542 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1976) (citing Moore v. Ogilvie. 
394 U.S. 814(1969)). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
All relevant provisions are provided in the text of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals the trial court's sentence imposed following her guilty plea to driving 
under the influence, a class A misdemeanor under § 41-6-44 of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 17, 1997, the State filed informations charging the Defendant with one count of 
driving under the influence and one count of driving on revocation. Defendant was represented 
throughout the proceedings by counsel from the Public Defender's Association of Weber County 
(PDA). On May 20, 1997, a negotiation between counsel for the Defendant, Martin Gravis, and 
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counsel for the State, resulted in Defendant's plea of guilty to the drunk driving charge and the 
State's dismissal of the driving on revocation; sentencing was set for June 24th. (R. 2-3). On 
June 24, 1997, the District Court granted a sentencing hearing at the request of Defendant's 
counsel, John Caine, to dispute the findings of the pre-sentence report prepared by Adult 
Probation and Parole (AP&P). 
On July 1, 1997, at 1:30 p.m., the court attempted to hold the sentencing hearing as 
scheduled, however neither of Defendant's previous attorneys, John Caine nor Martin Gravis, 
were present. (R. 4-5). The State was prepared for the hearing and had witnesses present to 
substantiate the finding of the AP&P report, but the court was forced to continue the hearing 
repeatedly until the end of that day's calendar. (R. 6-7). Finally, stating that u[t]here [was] no 
reason to set another hearing date" because she was "relying primarily on [Defendant's] prior 
DUI record in sentencing" and was only "relying on the pre-sentence report to a certain degree", 
the District Court Judge asked one of the two PDA attorneys in the courtroom, Michael Boyle, to 
take the opportunity to speak with the Defendant and to represent her for sentencing. (R. 5-7). 
After taking sufficient time to consult and confer with the Defendant, Mr. Boyle told the Judge, "I 
don't have any problem. I have had a chance to talk with her on this." (R. 8). Mr. Boyle then 
proceeded to make sentencing proposal to the court which included some jail time and a 
treatment program. (R. 8-9). 
Following Defense counsel's recommendation and an extensive exchange between the 
Defendant and the Judge, the court sentenced Defendant to one year in the County Jail to run 
consecutively with a separate offense, but allowing for statutory good time. (R. 13). Defendant 
was released from the Weber County Jail on October 29, 1997, and is not currently under any 
probationary supervision. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues she was denied her constitutional rights because: 1) the trial court 
refused to continue sentencing to allow her attorney to be present; and 2) the Defendant's 
3 
attorney failed to appear and failed to call witnesses on Defendant's behalf at the sentencing 
hearing. First, the State concedes the trial court refused to grant a continuance, however the 
State argues Defendant had adequate representation at her sentencing hearing and therefore 
Defendant's constitutional rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were not 
violated. The Defendant was represented by competent counsel at the sentencing hearing and her 
attorney made the strategic choice not to challenge the findings of the AP&P report. Although the 
Defendant may have had three separate attorneys from the PDA office representing her at 
different stages of the proceedings against her, that fact does not constitute a violation of 
Defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, Defendant can only succeed on 
appeal if she demonstrates that the attorney representing her at sentencing provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel and that the result of the sentencing hearing was thereby affected. 
In order for the Defendant to prevail on a claim that she was denied her constitutional 
rights due to ineffective assistance of counsel, she first "must show that counsel's performance 
was deficient" and "[s]econd, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
[her] defense." State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203-1204 (Utah 1984). The State contends the 
performance of Defendant's counsel at the sentencing hearing was adequate. Furthermore, even 
if it could be demonstrated that counsel was deficient, the trial court relied primarily upon 
Defendant's previous DUI record for sentencing, so any failure to dispute the findings of the 
AP&P report did not prejudice her defense. 
Second, the State asserts that the issues presented by Defendant's appeal have become 
moot as a result of her release from custody. The Defendant was released from the Weber 
County Jail on October 29, 1997, and currently is not even under probationary supervision. 
Because the Defendant no longer has a stake in the outcome of this appeal, this Court need not 
consume its judicial resources to reach the merits of the case. Additionally, the Defendant will not 
likely be subject to future adverse consequences because counsel failed to dispute the findings in 
the AP&P report. Furthermore, Defendant failed to object to the sentencing proceedings in the 
District Court, therefore it is questionable whether the issue was preserved for appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT 
HER SENTENCING HEARING FROM THE PDA ATTORNEY AND WAS 
NOT PREJUDICED BY ANY ALLEGED DEFICIENCY. 
The Defendant received effective assistance of counsel from the PDA's attorney 
representing her at sentencing. Just nine months ago in State v. Classon, this Court delineated the 
standard to be used in evaluating a claim such as the Defendant's. 
A defendant can be deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel 
by a lawyer who simply fails "to render 'adequate legal assistance.' " 
Generally, to successfully claim ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must satisfy a two-part test established by the Supreme Court in 
Strickland and recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lairby, 
699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984). Under this test, a defendant must show (1) 
that counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. First, to show counsel's 
performance was deficient, a defendant must establish that counseVs 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or, in 
other words, that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." To establish these serious errors occurred, a defendant must 
identify counsel's specific acts or omissions that "fall outside the wide 
range of professionally competent assistance." In doing so, a defendant 
must overcome our presumption that, when viewing the circumstances 
of the case as of the time of counseVs conduct, counseVs challenged 
action or omission was sound trial strategy. Second, to show prejudice, a 
defendant must show that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Under this 
prong of the test, the defendant must show that a "reasonable 
probability" exists that the trial result would have been different if 
counsel had not erred. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the reliability of the outcome." 
State v. Classon. 935 P.2d 524, 531-532 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted and emphasis 
added). Therefore, Defendant "has the difficult burden of showing actual unreasonable 
representation and actual prejudice." State v. Tvlen 850P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993). 
a. Defendant Was Adequately Represented By Counsel At Sentencing. 
First, Mr. Boyle, a competent PDA attorney, represented the Defendant at the sentencing 
hearing. It is not unusual for more than one attorney from the PDA to represent a Defendant at 
different stages of the case. Similar to the Defendant's circumstances, in the Tyler case cited 
above, the Defendant was represented by three separate attorneys during his defense. The 
Supreme Court of Utah held that the Defendant was not denied his constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel. IdL Moreover, the State also employed at least three separate attorneys as 
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its counsel in various stages of the proceedings. 
Mr. Boyle was not merely an attorney who happened to be present and standing next to 
the Defendant. In fact, the record demonstrates that Mr. Boyle took an active role advocating for 
the Defendant during the sentencing hearing. The record also indicates that Mr. Boyle took time 
to confer with the Defendant prior to advocating Defendant's position at sentencing. (R. 8). 
Merely because Mr. Boyle chose not to challenge the findings of the AP&P report as Mr. Caine 
had apparently planned does not mean that the Defendant was not represented at the sentencing 
hearing. The Defendant was in fact adequately represented by counsel at sentencing and there 
was no violation of Defendant's due process rights when the trial court refused to continue the 
case until Mr. Caine was available. 
Next, this Court must determine whether Mr. Boyle's representation of the Defendant at 
sentencing was deficient. When the Court indicated to Mr. Boyle that it was primarily relying 
upon Defendant's previous DUI record for sentencing, he counsel abandoned the strategy of 
attacking the findings of the AP&P report. A determination by Mr. Boyle that disputing the 
AP&P report was futile can hardly be classified as deficient performance and was likely a sound 
trial strategy. 
b. The Court's Primary Reliance on Defendant's Previous DUI Record 
During Sentencing Made Any Different Outcome Not Reasonably Probable 
by Disputing the AP&P Report. 
Because the court relied primarily on the Defendant's previous record of DUI convictions, 
it was not reasonably probable that disputing the findings of the AP&P report in a sentencing 
hearing would have produced any different outcome at sentencing. The second prong that must 
be proven by the Defendant to prevail in this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that she 
was prejudiced by her attorney's deficient performance. Classon at 532. Even if the court had 
granted a continuance so that the Defendant could dispute the findings of the AP&P report, the 
Defendant offers nothing to demonstrate that the court would have sentenced her differently. 
The State had witnesses at the sentencing hearing to support the findings in the AP&P 
report. Furthermore and most significantly, by the Judges own admission she relied only partially 
on the report. The Judge stated: 
6 
I also want to make clear for the record that I am relying on the pre-
sentence report to a certain degree. I am also relying primarily on your 
prior D VI record in sentencing you. Now I think probably the harshness 
of the sentence, in terms of recommending no good time and that type of 
thing, no statutory good time, may be going . . . they may have been relying 
on some of the things they heard. I am not inclined necessarily to impose 
that. However, J think the other part of the recommendation is justified 
solely on the basis of your record. 
Record, p. 6. (emphasis added). The Judge went on to sentence the Defendant to one year in jail. 
The Judge clearly stated that the portion of the AP&P report that she followed in 
sentencing was justified based solely on her previous DUI record. Therefore, unless the 
Defendant claims an error in the reporting of her previous record, she was in no way prejudiced 
by being sentenced without the benefit of disputing the findings in the AP&P report. As in Tyler, 
the Defendant in this appeal 
has not shown affirmatively shown that [she] was prejudiced by any 
conduct of counsel. [Her] allegations of prejudice are "wholly speculative" 
at best an "in no way give rise to the conclusion that 'but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result [at sentencing] would have been different.' 
" A review of counsels' efforts persuades us that even if their performance 
had been deficient, such deficiency did not result in prejudice to [the 
Defendant]. 
State v. Tvler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
In summary, Defendant's appeal is without merit because she was represented by counsel 
at sentencing. Furthermore, Mr. Boyle provided adequate advocacy in Defendant's behalf and the 
failure to dispute the findings of the AP&P report in no way prejudiced the Defendant. There is 
no reasonable probability that the outcome of Defendant's sentencing would have been different 
sufficient to "undermine confidence in the reliability of the outcome." Classon at 532 (citing 
Strickland). 
II. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL IS MOOT. 
Because the Defendant has fulfilled all of the obligations imposed by the Judge at 
sentencing, this Court need not reach the merits of Defendant's appeal. When the appellant no 
longer has a stake in the outcome of the case, the reviewing court is compelled to dismiss the 
action unless it becomes a class action or the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review". 
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In a similar case, the 10th Circuit stated that when the "appellant was released from further 
custody and supervision . . . [i]n the present posture of the case, we cannot rule on the merits. 
We must either dismiss the action as moot or remand for consideration of class certification. . . . 
we hold this action has become moot." Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825, 826 (10th Circ. 1976). 
What can the Defendant or the people served by this Court have to gain by deciding 
Defendant's case on the merits? Defendant's appeal only challenges the sentence imposed which 
has been fulfilled and completed. The Defendant has been released from custody and is not under 
probationary supervision. There can be no negative consequences for the Defendant if this Court 
dismisses her appeal. 
We hold that [Defendant's] appeal is moot. . . . because [she] is already 
released from custody . . . we find no purpose in reaching the merits of 
[her] arguments. . . . [Defendant] is not attacking [her] underlying 
conviction. Thus this case is distinguishable from decisions rejecting a 
claim of mootness because a petitioner faces continuing negative 
consequences as a result of a defective conviction. [Defendant] faces no 
collateral consequences from our decision to dismiss [her] appeal. 
Moreover, this case does not present an issue that is capable of repetition 
yet evading review. . . . the possibility that [Defendant] might be subjected 
to future adverse consequences because of [her AP&P] report is too 
speculative. 
Vandenberg v. Rodgers. 801 F.2d 377, 378 (10th Circ. 1986) (citations omitted). Like the 
Vandenberg case, there is no reason to decide Defendant's appeal on the merits. Defendant's 
appeal should be dismissed because the issue is moot. 
Moreover, Defendant's failure to object to the sentencing proceedings in the District 
Court may bar the Defendant from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. This Court has 
previously stated that only if "by reason of the claimed ineffectiveness, the matter was not raised 
below", or if the trial court was in "plain error" or if "exceptional circumstances exist" can an 
issue first be raised on appeal. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding that 
issues not brought before the trial court are generally barred from consideration on appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the State asks this Court to dismiss the Defendant's appeal without 
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considering the merits, or in the alternative to uphold Defendant's sentence. First, the issue on 
appeal is moot and the Defendant has no stake in the outcome of the case because she has been 
released from custody. Furthermore, there was no denial of the Defendant's constitutional rights 
to due process or to effective assistance of counsel. The principles in determining whether 
Defendant received adequate representation "are guides to the ultimate focus upon the 
fundamental fairness of the proceeding challenged, because the purpose of the inquiry is simply to 
insure that defendant receives a fair trial". Classon at 533 (citations omitted). 
Appellate Courts have an interest in discouraging meritless claims such as the Defendant's. 
We recently observed in a unanimous in banc opinion that we are troubled 
by how often we must confront meritless ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. . . . We therefore remind counsel of the gravity of the claim. An 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim implies a damaging allegation—i.e., it 
asserts that an attorney acted with such an appalling absence of 
professional competence that counsel was not functioning as the counsel 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. . . . Simply put, an 
ineffectiveness claim alleges counsel committed disciplinable professional 
misconduct. In the absence of facts that indicate counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . counsel should not 
use the claim to scrutinize every criminal representation and conviction that 
does not terminate in an acquittal. . . . Because an allegation of 
ineffectiveness broadcasts a professionally damaging message, counsel 
should consider whether the facts truly merit an ineffectiveness claim, or if 
they merely demonstrate the Court's maxim that there are countless ways 
to provide effective assistance in any given case. 
Miles v. Dorsev. 61 F.3d 1459, 1478 (10th Circ. 1995). The sentencing proceeding here in 
question meets the test of fundamental fairness. The State asks this Court to dismiss this appeal 
based on mootness, or to uphold the District Court's sentence. 
fa ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / b ^ day of December 1997. 
LES'DAROCZI 
DEPUTY COUNTYATTOI 
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This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion and memorandum 
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Kent E. Snider 
Public Defender Association, 
Inc., of Weber County 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
2564 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801)392-8247 
DATED this C/ day of December, 1997. 
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MR. GRAVIS: We can call number 10, Cynthia Robley. 
THE COURT: Has she been brought up? 
MR. GRAVIS: She is not in custody. She is here. 
THE-CLERK: The State of Utah vs. Cynthia Robley, 
975001647. 
MR. GRAVIS: Yes, your Honor, we have resolved this 
matter. She will plead to the Class A DUI. The State will 
dismiss the Driving on Revocation. 
THE COURT: Is that correct? 
MS. SJOGREN: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. If you plead guilty to the 
Class A Misdemeanor, you are giving up your right to the trial) 
in this case scheduled for the 2nd of June. Is that what you 
want to do today? 
MS. ROBLEY; Yes, your Honor, it is. 
THE COURT: If you admit that, it will automatically] 
go in your record as a conviction for a Class A Misdemeanor 
for DUI. It carries with it a fine of up to $2,500.00 and up 
to one year in jail is the maximum penalty. Do you understand] 
that? 
MS. ROBLEY: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: You have a right to have your attorney 
present throughout the proceedings. You have a right to 
require the State to prove you have actually committed the 
DUI, and that you have other offenses within six years, that 
2 
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is two offenses within six years of this violation, which ups 
it to a Class A Misdemeanor. 
You have to require--as I indicated, you have a right to 
a Jury trial, which I believe it was scheduled for. The Jury 
would consist of six people. All six people on the Jury would) 
have to be convinced unanimously of your guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt before you can be found guilty. 
Again, by pleading guilty, you are not requiring any of 
that to happen. Are you prepared to enter your plea today? 
MS. ROBLEY: Yes, I am. 
THE COURT: How do you plead to the Class A 
12
 I  Misdemeanor? 
13
 " MS. ROBLEY: Pleading guilty. 
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THE COURT: The State is moving to dismiss the othed 
charge? 
MS. SJOGREN: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Granted. It is a Class A. I think a 
pre-sentence would be appropriate. It would be June 24th at 
2:00 o'clock. 
MR. GRAVIS: That will be fine. 
THE COURT: It may be in the new building over here, 
other than this one. We are not exactly sure where we will 
be. You need to know where to go, okay? 
MS. ROBLEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. GRAVIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
3| 
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(July 1, 1997) 
THE COURT: We have Cynthia Robley. A Public 
Defender, John Caine, asked for a sentencing hearing. I set 
it for 1:30 so we could hear testimony. And he is not here. 
I am ready to go ahead with sentencing. 
MR. BOYLE: I.haven't talked to her. If we could 
pass that. Do you have some other matters we could do? 
THE COURT: But, I am not going to get into a re-
sentencing hearing later on. That was what we were going to 
do now. I think he has waived it now, if you want to handle 
the sentencing now. 
MR. BOYLE: John Caine was going to come over and 
handle the case, but he is not here. 
THE COURT: Well, we will see where we go. He may 
never show up. That's what they are doing these days. 
Go ahead and call the next case. 
1
 II (Case continued.) 
18 
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THE COURT: State vs. Cynthia Robley, case 
.965001647. 
THE COURT: This is a case that John Caine requested 
sentencing hearing on. It was specially set today at 1:30 at 
his request. He hasn't been here all afternoon. Mr. Miles, 
this is a PDA case. This was John Caine's case. He asked for 
sentencing hearing. It was set for 1:30 today. Witnesses 
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were here. I excused them when he didn't show up. I am not 
going to continue it past today. It was set for sentencing 
today. There is no reason to set another hearing date. And 
this is something you will have to take up with John Caine 
5
 || He had witnesses that sat here and sat here. And I am willinq 
to go ahead 
MS. ROBLEY: Excuse me, your Honor, John Caine was 
not my attorney. Martin Gravis was. And he was in another 
session. And Mr. Caine was acting in his behalf 
10
 || THE COURT: You are correct 
11
 || MS. ROBLEY: And it was supposed to be a 1:30 
12
 I' hearing regarding an A P & P report 
13
 || THE COURT: Just a minute. Wasn't this set for John| 
Caine? He was here last time with you. He was the one that 
asked for the sentencing hearing. 
MS. ROBLEY: Well, when--he asked for the A P & P 
hearing. 
THE COURT: That's correct. 
MS. ROBLEY: Because I was disputing it. It was set] 
for 1:30. 
THE COURT: You were disputing it. But I am 
prepared now to go ahead with sentencing. We have had the 
hearing set and no one followed up on it. And so we are going] 
to go ahead with it. 
MS. ROBLEY: That wasn't my fault. 
51 
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THE COURT: Well, I also--I also want to make clear 
for the record that I am relying on the pre-sentence report tcj 
a certain degree. I am also relying primarily on your prior 
DUI record in sentencing you. Now I think probably the 
harshness of the sentence, in terms of recommending no good 
time and that type of thing, no statutory good time, may be 
going--they may have been relying on some of the things they 
heard. I am not inclined necessarily to impose that. 
However, I think the other part of the recommendation is 
justified solely on the basis of your record. 
Anything from the State? You indicated you wanted to 
say something? 
MS. SJOGREN: I just wanted to say for the record, 
your Honor, the witnesses that were here earlier were 
witnesses subpoenaed by the State, and they were the State's 
witnesses that were present here. 
THE COURT: And it didn't seem fair to me that they 
should have to sit and wait and wait and wait. 
MS. SJOGREN: I agree. I just wanted to make the 
record clear in case the Defendant--
THE COURT: This was continued from last week on a 
special setting and no follow up. 
MR. MILES: Apparently witnesses are here on 
Preliminary Hearing. Both of them are in custody. Would you 
give Mr. Boyle a chance to speak with her about the 
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sentencing? I understand the Court is considered to have its 
mind made up, but obviously she is entitled to some 
representation. We haven't had a chance to review it. If Mr 
Caine was supposed to be coming over here, he is not, so she 
ought to obviously have the benefit of having an attorney 
review that and address the court. 
MR. BOYLE: I was trying to get ahold of Mr. Caine 
to see if he was coming over here. 
MR. MILES: He indicated he wasn't. So we need an 
opportunity to speak with her. With both of them being in 
custody, could we hold the Preliminary Hearing? 
THE COURT: How many more do we have to do? 
THE CLERK: That's it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is the other person in custody? 
MR. MILES: He is. 
THE COURT: And that's the only other thing? 
THE CLERK: Other than the affidavits. That would 
be it. 
THE COURT: All right. All right. 
(Case continued.) 
THE CLERK: Recall the State of Utah vs. Cynthia 
Robley, 95001647. 
THE COURT: I know I am putting you on the spot 
somewhat, Mr. Boyle. I don't mean to. I don't think the 
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record will reflect that this is something that you were 
supposed to be here on in terms of sentencing hearing. 
MR. BOYLE: I don't have any problem. I have had a 
chance to talk with her on this. I am not sure what happened 
II with the witnesses and all that. 
THE COURT: Well, I know what happened. They were 
here. And in fact I think even the State brought them in. I 
excused some of them because there was--it had been set at 
1:30 for this hearing. 
MS. SJOGREN: Everyone was here but the attorney. 
THE COURT: Apparently so. No else was here to 
handle it. And I wasn't going to make all these people wait 
when I called it specially at 1:30. And I am ready to go 
ahead. 
MR. BOYLE: Okay. I have had a chance to talk with 
her about this. What we would like to do, she has currently 
served almost six months in jail. 
THE COURT: Not on this case. 
MR. BOYLE: No, not on this case. It was on the 
Weber County case in front of Judge Storey. And it wasn't a 
straight six months. She was in and came back out. And now 
she is back in. 
What we would ask the Court to do in this case--and we 
are clearly aware of her DUI record. What I think would 
probably be in her best interests, as well as I think 
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society's, is for her to serve the six months under the Weber 
County case, which is the 14th. Have this case run concurrent 
with that, so that she will basically be given six month's 
credit. And then she would have to serve out an additional 
5
 I  six months on this case. 
Now, in addition to that, what I would like to do is, she) 
has had some conversation with a friend through Serenity 
House. It appears it is a little bit better for circumstances) 
for women as opposed to men. It doesn't seem like it is 
taking them as long to place them in a bed. What it appears 
is she could probably get a bed within a month and a half or 
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 || two months. We ask that this case run concurrent with Judge 
13 H
 Storey's. She have an additional six months sentence. We askj 
14 the Court to hold her in jail until a bed in Serenity house 
becomes available, hopefully that will be a month and a half 
or two months. Then she would have to do a 90 day in patient 
treatment program. And then she is out on parole under the 
terms of probation. 
That pretty much--all together she would serve a year in 
all, albeit she would also be serving it under Judge Storey's 
case as well. I think that would be enough to get her 
attention, modify her behavior, as well as provide kind of--
what we need after all of this is a treatment program to 
24
 address the issue of her alcohol consumption. 
THE COURT: Mr. Daines, do you have any input on 
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this? 
MR. DAINES: Sorry, I don't, your Honor. I don't 
know anything about this case. It would be unfair for me to 
talk about it. 
5
 || THE COURT: Well, I think perhaps the recommendation 
that there be given no statutory good time in this case, and 
no community release, which I agree with, is one thing, but I 
 || think that may be carrying it somewhat far. I have got very* 
serious question as to whether treatment is really something 
that's really going to be of much value in this case to be 
quite honest, given the report and given what's been stated. 
And given the history, I just don't see that there is any--it 
doesn't mean that you can't stop drinking and driving. That's] 
what I am really concerned about here. I am far less 
concerned about the drinking problem than I am with the fact 
of the chronic getting in the car. It doesn't take much--
MS. ROBLEY: At this point in time--
THE COURT: It doesn't take much to stay out of the 
car when you have been drinking, unless you are so out of 
control that you can't make a judgment on it, in which case 
you should be incarcerated. I 
That's the problem here. I will let you make a 
statement. I did not allow you to do that before. I got 
short circuited by the request for sentencing hearing so you 
didn't get to make a statement. I will let you make a 
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statement. I think you see where I am coming from. 
Go ahead. 
MS. ROBLEY: My own thoughts, your Honor, the only 
alcohol treatment program I have ever had was through Weber 
County DNA, which was not extensive. And because of 
medications I was being prescribed for osteoporosis and high 
blood pressure and that, at that time I could not take 
antibuse because it basically threw my blood pressure into a 
tizzy, as well as everything else in my system. I have never 
had any kind of treatment program other than the basic one DNA| 
does provide, which is basically informational and open 
discussion. And I did complete those. The only problem I had) 
was economically. 
THE COURT: What about Clinical Consultants? 
MS. ROBLEY: Clinical Consultants, I could not 
continue with because I had to make payments up front. And at| 
that point in time I was fighting my Social Security, and I 
did not have it. 
And my husband at the time was not working because he had] 
to have a colostomy. So we were just barely surviving. 
THE COURT: In May of '96 Judge Storey ordered you 
to complete an in patient drug treatment program. 
MS. ROBLEY: Correct. 
THE COURT: Why didn't you do that? 
MS. ROBLEY: Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hoover, who I 
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was engaged to, was hit by a vehicle. Mr. Storey was kind 
enough to give me extensions until we got Gary out of the 
hospital. Within not even four months after he was released 
from the hospital, he passed away. As a matter of fact, that 
was a month after my arrest on March 15th on this new DUI. 
THE COURT: So you have had lots of opportunities, 
but you just haven't been able to manage to get away and find 
8
 (I time to do it, is that it? 
MS. ROBLEY: That as well as the financing, that is 
correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Why would this be any different then? 
12
 || MS. ROBLEY: I do have the monies available at this 
13
 " point in time through a family friend to help me go ahead and 
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get into a treatment program and get this dealt with at my 
request. And to my knowledge she stated also if it was Court 
Ordered, the money still stood. 
And I also want to try antibuse, because at this point in| 
time I have quit taking all my medications. 
THE COURT: Well, I think the recommendation is a 
fair one. I think that it doesn't preclude anyone, after they] 
serve their jail time, from going out and getting help for 
themselves, which I think you should do. Really it is 
probably the best form when you decide that you really do want| 
it. I don't think telling you is going to make any 
difference. I really don't. I don't think that it works very] 
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well. We could do it. We try to do it. But it doesn't 
necessarily constitute — 
MS. ROBLEY: I don't drink to get drunk. I drink 
because I enjoy the taste. 
THE COURT: To be quite honest, I don't care if you 
drink or not. You can drink until, you know, you can't see, 
you know, if that really is what you want to do. But I don't 
think you really want to do that. But if you do want to do 
it, I don't have a problem with that. 
But your driving when you are drinking, you constitute a 
danger to the community. That's what we are here to address. 
I will sentence you to a year in the County Jail. It 
will not run concurrent with the other case. These are 
separate offenses, and it would be, I think, a joke really to 
run it concurrent. 
I will, however, not limit you to no statutory good time, 
I don't have a problem with them giving you statutory good 
time. However, I will indicate in this there is no consensual 
decree release or no community release early from your 
sentence, other than giving you statutory good time, because 
of the nature of the offense. And frankly I think this may 
have been able to be charged as a felony possibly. And so 
that's where we are at with it. And that's what we are going 
to do. 
MR. BOYLE: Your Honor, can she be--if she is going 
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to do the one year, can she do that in prison? 
THE COURT: Not if she is given statutory good time 
That puts it at nine months. Most of them get it, don't theyrj 
It is not a year. 
MR. BOYLE: Pretty much guaranteed at Weber County 
Jail. But my understanding of the statute is if she is 
sentenced to one year, she can elect to serve it down at the 
Prison. 
THE COURT: I don't think she can elect to do it if 
it is statutory good time. It is less than a year. That's 
what she has been given, so--if I would--if she elects to do 
that, she will spend her one year at the State Prison. I 
think I can order her to do that and she won't be given 
statutory good time, if that's what she wants to do. But I 
don't know if they will accept her under those conditions. 
But frankly I want to see some statutory authority if I 
give her statutory good time, as I just did. It wasn't in 
response to a request for that. But she is looking at doing 
nine months. I don't think that qualifies for release down 
there. 
MS. ROBLEY: I don't have a problem with a 15 months] 
sentence right now, and appeal it. 
THE COURT: Anyway, if you want to file a brief, I 
will take a look at it. Other than that, I am not going to 
just do it. 
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